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TEXAS TIGHTENS ABORTION RESTRICTIONS:
ABBOTT, PHYSICIAN ADMITTANCE REQUIREMENTS, AND
WHAT IT REALLY MEANS FOR TEXAS WOMEN
Rebecca Waddell
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v.
Abbott,
748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision of
Roe v. Wade1 in 1973, the issue of abortion and women’s rights has
been at the forefront of cultural, political, and judicial debates. And,
because few issues incite the same level of passion and emotion, the
debate (and the litigation) never seems to end. Beginning with
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,2 and later
Gonzales v. Carhart,3 the Supreme Court strived to articulate tests for
states implementing restrictions on women’s access to abortion
services. Yet, as American citizens further recede to opposite ends of
the political spectrum, this hot-button issue is increasingly present in
the political arena, and thus consistently readdressed by state
legislatures.
Unsurprisingly, the effect of this polarization is
continually hashed out in courts, and the case of Planned Parenthood
of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott4 is no exception.
Brought before the Fifth Circuit on appeal from the Western
District of Texas, Abbott addresses the constitutionality of recent
provisions passed by the Texas Legislature that restrict access to

1

410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court relied upon the Due Process Clause to
establish that personal liberty includes a woman’s right to end a pregnancy via
abortion. Id. at 153.
2
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Court
reinforced a woman’s right to an abortion, but only before the fetus reaches viability.
Id. at 870. The Court further defined “viability” as the point after which the fetus
becomes able to survive outside the womb. Id. Secondly, the Court restricted states
implementing new abortion legislation from imposing any “undue burden”—
substantial strain—on women attempting to acquire an abortion. Id. at 878.
3
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (holding that abortion restrictions
imposed by states must have a “rational basis”).
4
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II),
748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).
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abortion services within the state.5 Two provisions—the first
mandating hospital admittance privileges for physicians performing
abortions, and the second enforcing a strict medication protocol—form
the basis on this litigation.6 Though still ongoing, the latest opinion in
the Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v.
Abbott line of cases, issued by the Fifth Circuit in March 2014,
reversed the district court’s judgment enjoining the implementation of
the new laws, and upheld the provisions as constitutional.7
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In July of 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill No. 2,
to later be codified in the Texas Health & Safety Code Annotated,8
which, in part, amended regulations regarding abortion procedures.9
Two provisions of the bill, which were to take effect on October 29,
2013, were of particular interest to practicing physicians.10 The first
provision at issue requires physicians performing abortions to have
admittance privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the
procedure takes place.11 The second limits the administration of
medication to induce an abortion to the protocol required by the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with a few
marked exceptions.12
Because of the effect the bill would have on clinics and
patients across the state, Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical
Health Services, joined by others (collectively, Planned Parenthood),
filed suit challenging the constitutionally of the law.13 Planned

5

Id. at 587.
Id.
7
Id. at 605.
8
Id. at 587 n.1.
9
Id. at 587.
10
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott I),
734 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2013).
11
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.0031(a)(1); Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 409.
Further, subpart b of the section “criminalizes a physician’s failure to comply.”
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 587 n.2.
12
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.063(a); Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 416. Prior
to the amendment, most physicians administering the medication in Texas had
relaxed the standard of the FDA protocol to the “off-label protocol,” which reduced
the number of required visits to receive medication. Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 416. In
Abbott II, the court emphasized the safety reasons behind enforcing the FDA
protocol, over the “off-label protocol,” focusing on the ability of the attending
physician to monitor the health of the woman after receiving the medication. Id. at
416-17.
13
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 409.
6
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Parenthood’s claim called on the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, which guarantees patients’ rights to liberty and
property.14
After a three-day bench trial, the district court judge found the
first provision to be unconstitutional, and ordered a permanent
injunction to stop enforcement of the hospital admittance
requirement.15 The second provision, regarding the administration of
medication, was found to be constitutional, except in instances when,
in the physician’s opinion, a violation of the protocol is medically
necessary for the health of the mother.16 For “health of the mother”
cases, the district court partially enjoined the second provision.17 The
State immediately appealed, and filed a motion to stay the injunction.18
Because of the expedited nature of case, an emergency motion
to stay the injunction was heard by the Fifth Circuit within forty-eight
hours.19 The decision to grant the stay hinged predominantly on
whether the State “made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits.”20 The State argued, and the court was persuaded, that
the provision was intended to reduce problems that occur from
physician abandonment—dissolution of the doctor-patient relationship
after the procedure—and the medical complications that arise.21
According to the State, the regulation is intended to promote continued
medical care, and foster relations between physicians and their female
patients.22
Finding that the State “made a strong showing of likelihood of
success on the merits” for the admitting privileges requirement, and

14

Id. at 409-10; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
15
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 410. At the bench trial, because of the expedited process,
Planned Parenthood submitted few witnesses and both sides relied primarily upon
affidavits. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 588.
16
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 410.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 588.
20
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 410.
21
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 411. According to the Fifth Circuit, the lower court, which
claimed the requirement had no rational basis, overlooked the State’s interest in
regulating the process to protect women’s health. Id.
22
Id. Because the lower court blatantly rejected the legislature’s requirement, the
Fifth Circuit goes on to suggest the conclusion “is but one step removed from
repudiating the longstanding recognition from the Supreme Court that a State may
constitutionally require that only a physician may perform an abortion.” Id.
Moreover, the court asserts that the implementation of the regulations did not
constitute an “undue burden,” as the lower court suggested. Id. at 413.
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that it demonstrated likely success as to part of the district court's
hand-crafted “health of the mother” exception to the medication
abortion regulation,23 the court granted the stay pending the outcome
of the appeal.24 Further, the court expedited the hearing of the appeal
for full consideration on the merits.25
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision to grant the State’s
motion to stay the judgment, Planned Parenthood immediately
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.26 The Court, however,
in a five to four decision, refused to vacate the stay.27 In a concurrence
penned by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that it could not
vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay “unless that court clearly and
‘demonstrably’ erred in its application of ‘accepted standards.’”28 The
dissent, however, focused on six factors, including maintaining the
status quo and expected levels of access for women in Texas, and
stressed the need to vacate the stay.29
The stay was upheld, and the expedited briefing and oral
arguments were heard by the Fifth Circuit in January 2014.30 In
March, the Fifth Circuit addressed the merits of the State’s appeal in
Abbott II.31
III.
ANALYSIS
On full hearing of the merits, the State argued that the district
court erred on multiple points, including: “[1] facially invalidating the
admitting-privileges regulation; [and] [2] creating a broad and vague
health exception to the medication abortion regulations . . . .”32 The
Fifth Circuit addressed each issue in turn.33

23

Id. at 416.
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 419.
25
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 419.
26
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct.
506 (2013). While briefing the Supreme Court, however, Planned Parenthood
focused solely on the first provision and the ramifications of the stay on physicians
and patients in acquiring an abortion. See Brief for Applicant, Planned Parenthood of
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013) (No. 13A452),
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4599, at *1.
27
Abbott, 134 S. Ct. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28
Id. (quoting W. Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters, 480 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1987)).
29
Abbott, 134 S. Ct. at 508-9 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 419.
31
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II),
748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).
32
Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id.
24
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A. Admittance Privileges
First, when considering these issues, the Fifth Circuit
determined the governing test here stems from Casey, and whether the
restriction qualifies as an “undue burden,” meaning it “has the purpose
or effect of creating a ‘substantial obstacle’ to a woman’s choice.’”34
Thus, the question becomes “whether Planned Parenthood has met its
burden to prove that the admitting privileges regulation imposes an
undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose an abortion.”35
To bolster its constitutional claim that the hospital admittance
requirement was an undue burden, Planned Parenthood relied on
expert testimony claiming the risk to a mother in an abortion
procedure is minimal.36 Further, its experts stated that in the rare
instance that further medical attention is needed for the mother, ER
physicians are properly trained to care for a patient experiencing
complications.37 Essentially, the need for the restriction to protect the
mother’s health is slight.38
According to Planned Parenthood, the burden it creates,
however, is immense.39 Because many hospitals maintain strict
policies against administering abortions, few are willing to grant
admittance privileges to physicians that perform the procedure.40
Furthermore, based on the lack of credentialing among physicians
currently administering the procedure and the unlikelihood local
hospitals will extend privileges to them, an estimated one-third of all
abortion clinics in the state will close.41 According to Planned
Parenthood experts, that would result in roughly 22,000 women in

34

Id. at 590; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590.
36
Id. at 591. According to Planned Parenthood’s expert witness, Dr. Paul Fine, a
board-certified OB/GYN, “only 2.5 percent of women who have a first—trimester
surgical abortion undergo minor complications, while fewer than 0.3 percent
experience a complication that requires hospitalization.” Id.
37
Id. Another expert witness, Dr. Jennifer Carnell, testified that “ER physicians have
experience in treating abortion-related complications, which are very similar to the
symptoms of miscarriage, a condition commonly seen in ERs.” Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 591-92. Indeed, a head of one Texas clinic testified that in an attempt to
recruit five new physicians to the clinic, three were “unable to join [the clinic’s] staff
because their primary practice or hospitals barred them from working as abortion
care providers.” Id.
41
Id. at 591.
35
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Texas losing the ability to procure an abortion.42 In short, it is an
incredible burden.
The State, however, countered Planned Parenthood’s facts and
statistics with the broad notion that the hospital admittance
requirement serves a greater State interest because:
(a) it provides a more thorough evaluation mechanism
of physician competency which better protects patient
safety; (b) it acknowledges and enables the importance
of continuity of care; (c) it enhances inter-physician
communication and optimizes patient information
transfer and complication management; and (d) it
supports the ethical duty of care for the operating
physician to prevent patient abandonment.43
Focusing on continuity of care and credentialing of physicians,
the State, in a typical battle of the experts, refuted all of Planned
Parenthood’s testimony.44 Claiming Planned Parenthood’s statistics
underestimated risk and overestimated the ability of ER physicians, the
State continually emphasized the need for increased safety precautions
and tighter regulation on credentialing and relicensing of physicians.45
Again persuaded by the State’s argument, the Fifth Circuit
found that Planned Parenthood’s argument establishing an undue
burden was “vague and imprecise, fail[ed] to correlate with the
evidence, and even if credited, fail[ed] to establish an undue burden
according to the Supreme Court’s decisions.”46
First, taking issue with the estimated number of women
affected, the court noted that of the counties in the Rio Grande Valley
area discussed in the record, the greatest distance of travel to a clinic
was 150 miles, and, under Casey, that would not qualify as an undue
burden.47 Second, though some clinics will likely close, there is no

42

Id. This number was calculated as approximately one-third of the total number
(72,470) of women that obtained abortions in Texas in 2011. Id. at 591 n.10.
43
Id. at 592.
44
Id. at 592-93. The expert for the State claimed the studies cited by Planned
Parenthood were nearly forty years old, and current trends indicated complications
occurred in approximately one-third to one-half of all abortions. Id. at 593.
However, the expert also claimed most complications went unreported. Id.
45
Id. at 592-93.
46
Id. at 597.
47
Id. at 598; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (discussing that in Pennsylvania, most women were required to
travel at least one hour, and sometimes more than three hours, to obtain an abortion,
and that did not qualify as an undue burden).
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empirical evidence that the women in those rural areas would be
unable to obtain an abortion from another functioning clinic.48 Lastly,
the Court found that Planned Parenthood likely overestimated the
difficultly of obtaining admittance privileges for physicians.49 Indeed,
the Court went on to state that “[i]n a number of areas in Texas,”
physicians already possess admittance privileges, and further, hospitals
may not discriminate against physicians that perform abortions by
withholding admittance privileges.50
Next, the Fifth Circuit attacked the district court’s opinion for
finding in favor of Planned Parenthood in light of the State’s “lack of
evidence” to establish a rational basis under Gonzales.51 The court
simply noted that the State is not required to supply evidence.52
Indeed, the court is required to “presume that the law in question is
valid and sustain it so long as the law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”53 Furthermore, once a connection, albeit
abstract, is made between the law and a state interest, the test is
satisfied.54 And, because “[m]ost legislation deals ultimately in
probabilities,”55 later success of the law need not be “proven.”56
By that measure, when substantiating the State’s argument, the
court noted that the State “explained that the credentialing process
entailed in the regulation reduces the risk that abortion patients will be
subjected to woefully inadequate treatment.”57 In short, there is a
rational connection between the regulation (the admittance
requirement) and the state’s interest (reducing the risk to the mother).
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that, when applying the proper
rational basis test, “the State acted within its prerogative to regulate the
medical profession by heeding these patient-centered concerns and

48

Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 598-99.
Id. at 598.
50
Id.; see TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002(b) (“A hospital or health care facility
may not discriminate against a physician, nurse, staff member or employee because
of the person’s willingness to participate in an abortion procedure at another
facility.”). Furthermore, physicians may take private action against health care
facilities that actively discriminate. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.003.
51
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 593-94.
52
Id. 594.
53
Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. The court further notes that “[t]he court may not replace legislative predictions
or calculations of probabilities with its own . . . .” Id.; see also Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (concluding that rational basis review does not give courts the
power to judge the wisdom or logic of legislators).
57
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 595.
49
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requiring abortion practitioners to obtain admittance privileges at a
nearby hospital.”58
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that “the district court’s
opinion applied wrong legal standards on the rational basis and
purpose tests and clearly erred in finding that ‘24 counties in the Rio
Grande Valley would be left with no abortion provider.’” 59 Further,
the court emphasized that the district court “erroneously concluded
that [House Bill No. 2] imposed an undue burden in a large fraction of
the cases.”60 Thus, the court held that the physician admittance
requirement satisfied the rational basis review delineated by Casey and
Gonzales, and upheld the provision as constitutional.61
B. Protocol for Administering Medication
Regarding the regulation of abortion-inducing medication and
the stricter FDA protocol, the Fifth Circuit again addressed and
discarded the lower court’s opinion.62 Prior to the amendment, most
physicians administering the medication in Texas had relaxed the
standard of the FDA protocol to the “off-label protocol,” which
reduced the number of required visits to receive medication.63 Further,
the FDA protocol limits the time for administering abortions via
mediation to forty-nine days after conception, while physicians
following the “off-label protocol” often administer the drug up to
sixty-three days into the pregnancy.64
According to Planned
Parenthood’s expert witnesses, this becomes necessary when a woman,
due to certain physical features or medical conditions, cannot safely
undergo a surgical abortion.65
The State, on the other hand, emphasized the safety reasons
behind enforcing the FDA protocol, over the “off-label protocol,”
focusing on the ability of the attending physician to monitor the health

58

Id.
Id. at 599-600.
60
Id. at 600.
61
Id. at 594-95.
62
Id. at 604-05.
63
Id. at 600.
64
Id. at 601.
65
Id. at 601. Planned Parenthood’s expert, Dr. Fine, stated that first-trimester
surgical abortions can be “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for some women.
Id. at 602. Women who are “extremely obese, have uterine fibroids distorting
normal anatomy, have a uterus that is very flexed, or have certain uterine anomalies,
such as a malformed uterus” may be at risk when receiving surgical abortions, and
physicians resort to abortion via medication. Id.
59
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of the woman after receiving the medication.66 The State’s witness
claimed “drug-induced abortions present more medical complications
and adverse events than surgical abortions, with six percent of
medication abortions eventually requiring surgery to complete the
abortion, often on an emergency basis.”67
While the lower court did not find the new regulation enforcing
FDA protocol as a whole to be unconstitutional, it included an
exception for the “health of the mother,” and stopped the enforcement
of the regulation in those cases by injunction.68 The Fifth Circuit,
however, remained unconvinced and found that the medication
regulation did not “facially require a court-imposed exception for the
life and health of the [mother].”69 Because the regulation did not
entirely ban the abortion practice, as it did in Gonzales, and because no
consensus was reached over the safety advantages of either method,
the court found the “health of the mother” exception to be overly broad
and unnecessary.70
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit found for the State on all counts
and reversed the lower court’s decision.71 House Bill No. 2 is now in
full force, with only one noted exception—physicians that “timely
applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a
response from the hospital” receive temporary immunity.72
IV.

RAMIFICATIONS

Here, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dissected many
compelling arguments in favor of the legislation, and doing so,
touched on many contemporary abortion issues. While, at face value,
the new provisions appear to decrease access to abortion services,
particularly for younger women from rural areas and lower socioeconomic positions, the Fifth Circuit makes a rather convincing
argument to the contrary. In its first decision, when determining
whether to stay the injunction, the court virtually praises the
legislation, celebrating the amendment to the abortion laws as a much

66

Id. at 602.
Id.
68
Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 416.
69
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 604.
70
Id. at 604-05.
71
Id. at 605.
72
Id.
67
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needed increase in medical safety.73 The argument goes as far as to
claim advocacy in favor of women’s health and well-being.74
Although Planned Parenthood argues the new laws would
mean approximately 22,000 women in Texas would no longer have
access to an abortion, the court finds the estimate to be
unsubstantiated.75 The court insists the regulations would not hinder
women’s access to the service, but simply increase the safety
precautions associated with the procedure. Seemingly, there would be
few consequences for the women of Texas, and the largest burden
would fall on the physicians, requiring the continual upkeep of
licensing.
The court found that Planned Parenthood’s estimates were
invalid because Planned Parenthood assumed that the women seeking
abortions from now-closed clinics would be unable to travel great
distances to obtain one elsewhere.76 While it is true that some women
will commute to the other clinics, there are still a great number of
women unable to travel that distance because of limited resources.
Furthermore, particularly in rural settings, there is the added burden of
traveling hundreds of miles to the closest abortion clinic—is that not
the definition of undue burden?
Since Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey in 1992, where Justice O’Connor first established the concept of
undue burden,77 courts have continued to struggle with its meaning
and application. Termed “notoriously nonspecific,”78 the undue
burden requirement wreaks havoc with legislators and judges alike,
leading to marked inconsistencies in abortion regulations across the
country. With lack of clarity as justification, more conservative
jurisdictions have pushed against the term, expanding where they see
fit to implement additional hindrances before a woman can exercise
her freedom of choice.

73

See Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 411-13. Indeed, the court suggests that the law in fact
benefits women and the medical field as a whole by “ensur[ing] that credentialing of
physicians beyond initial licensing and periodic license renewal occurs,” and
“protecting the health of women who undergo abortion procedures.” Id. The court
finds that it allows the state to install a necessary safeguard to insure patient safety.
Id.
74
See id.
75
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 598; see also Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 414.
76
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 597-98.
77
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
78
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe at 40: The Controversy Continues: Session 2: Abortion
Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047,
1049 (2014).
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Consequently, the burden these now legitimized regulations
place on the women of Texas is only the beginning. The biggest
danger stemming from this victory for the State lies in fellow state
legislatures taking notice. Although similar regulations have graced
the floors of state congressional halls in the past, few received such
marked success.79 Even among the few states that do possess
physician admittance requirements,80 the current Texas rules are the
most harsh and sweeping physicians have encountered. And now that
the Fifth Circuit has upheld their validity, it is only a matter of time
until neighboring states follow suit. Furthermore, the significant
media attention this bill received in the summer of 2013, when Wendy
Davis performed a 21-hour filibuster on the Senate floor, merely
solidified the regulations’ place in the public and political spotlight.81
Indeed, this was not a law that passed unnoticed.
Although Planned Parenthood will likely appeal to the
Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the Court will affirm the ruling,
strike it down as unconstitutional, or even take the case at all.
However, it is clear that other states will take notice of the new rules.
Whether similar bills will consequently make their way through the
houses of various state congresses, however, is yet to be seen.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because of the deeply personal, religious, moral and social
issues related to a woman’s right to choose, the issue of abortion is one
that has been hotly debated in the United States for many years. In the
wake of numerous conservative backlashes, the subject’s ability to
spark controversy is omnipresent. Consequently, with ever-tightening

79

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir.
2013) (striking down a physician admittance requirement passed in Wisconsin). The
Fifth Circuit Court in Abbott II acknowledged the failure of the requirement in
Wisconsin, but distinguished it by emphasizing the court there ruled on a preliminary
injunction, not a permanent injunction, and Wisconsin physicians were given merely
days to comply with the regulation, while those in Texas were given 100 days.
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 596.
80
See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envlt.
Control, 317 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding admittance privileges for abortion
providers to be beneficial to female patients); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cnty., Inc.
v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding a Missouri state
regulation requiring admittance privileges because it “further[ed] important state
health objectives”).
81
See Manny Fernandez, Filibuster in Texas Senate Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/senatedemocrats-in-texas-try-blocking-abortion-bill-with-filibuster.html.
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regulations imposed at the state level, courts continue to interpret and
decipher the laws associated with abortion. As is seen in the case of
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v.
Abbott, the women of Texas now face greater obstacles in acquiring
this fundamental right to choose. With Abbott, however, the story may
not be over.
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